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Legal Ethics Is About the Law, Not Morality or
Justice: A Reply to Critics
W. Bradley Wendel*
In Martin Scorsese’s concert film Shine A Light, guitarist Jack White
joins the Rolling Stones on stage for one song.1 As he is playing and singing,
he keeps stealing glances at Mick Jagger and is unable to stop grinning like
an idiot. It is obvious to any viewer what he is thinking in that moment:
“Holy s---, I’m playing with the Rolling Stones!” I know exactly how he
feels, since the legal ethics equivalent of the Rolling Stones have been
gracious enough to invite me onto the stage with them. Like Jack White
growing up listening to Keith Richards, I have been reading and learning
from the scholars in this Colloquy for as long as I can remember—maybe
copping a few licks while trying to find my own distinctive sound, but
always conscious of the pioneering work of my predecessors. Not only do I
admire the work of my reviewers enormously, but I am deeply grateful for
the sympathetic mindset with which they approached the book. Reading
through the reviews, I frequently found myself saying, “Yes, that’s exactly
the point.” Engaged critics make disagreement an even more urgent matter
for an author, as there is no way to write off such criticism as the result of
misunderstanding or as attacking a straw version of the position in the book.
As a result, I fear that I have not done justice to all of the points raised in
these reviews. In some instances, the book has to speak for itself.2 In other
cases, a satisfactory response to a challenging point raised in one of these
reviews would require a separate essay, well beyond the space constraints of
this brief response. I am hopeful that the reviews are only the beginning of a
debate about the book, because I have a lot more to say!
I.

Indeterminacy

All of the reviewers express, in one form or another, the concern that
law cannot perform the function assigned to it in my theory. They accurately
summarize the argument that the law supersedes societal controversy and
provides a moderately stable, provisional framework for cooperation,
* Professor of Law, Cornell University.
1. SHINE A LIGHT (Paramount Classics 2008).
2. For example, Pepper and Simon object strongly to my take on the case of Daniel Bibb, the
prosecutor in the Manhattan District Attorney’s office who allegedly contrived with defense lawyers
to scuttle the retrial of two defendants whom Bibb believed were innocent. Stephen L. Pepper, The
Lawyer Knows More than the Law, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 691 , 696 (2012) (book review); William H.
Simon, Authoritarian Legal Ethics: Bradley Wendel and the Positivist Turn, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 709,
711–12 (2012) (book review). Maybe readers will remain unpersuaded, but I really do not think I
can improve on the arguments in the book.
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notwithstanding normative and empirical disagreement. They worry,
however, that the law is incapable of settling society-wide disagreement. If it
is not, there would seem to be little reason to respect it. Kruse puts the
objection quite clearly and powerfully: “If law lacks the capacity to settle
deep and persistent normative controversy in society, then Wendel’s functional argument for the legitimacy of law falls away.”3 The problem is not
that the process is random, like consulting a Magic 8-Ball, but that the law
merely reproduces social disagreement in the guise of legal interpretation.
Pepper appeals to what H.L.A. Hart refers to as the open texture of law.4
Hart notes that subsuming specific facts under instances of a general rule
calls for the exercise of judgment, and no rule can determine its own application in advance.5 The law may also embody awkward compromises, have
more than one purpose, or be such a hodgepodge that it is essentially
purposeless.6 Kruse makes a similar point when she says, “[I]t is
questionable that law has the capacity to settle moral controversy.”7 Simon’s
objection is different. He does not so much assert the indeterminacy of law
as rely on its determinacy and claim that I have gotten the legal analysis
wrong because I assume a formalistic style of legal reasoning.8

3. Katherine R. Kruse, Fidelity to Law and the Moral Pluralism Premise, 90 TEXAS L. REV.
657, 663 (2012) (book review).
4. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127–28 (2d ed. 1994) (“Whichever device,
precedent or legislation, is chosen for the communication of standards of behaviour, these, however
smoothly they work over the great mass of ordinary cases, will, at some point where their
application is in question, prove indeterminate; they will have what has been termed an open
texture.”).
5. See id. at 130 (“We shall thus indeed succeed in settling in advance, but also in the dark,
issues which can only reasonably be settled when they arise and are identified.”). Pepper’s criticism
is clearly indebted to Hart:
As enacted, a legal provision is a generality . . . . The lawyer, however, is present at a
specific potential application of that legal provision. . . . A legal provision’s moral or
policy compromise is up in the air, general, and abstract; lawyer and client are down on
the ground where the law’s effect will be concrete and specific.
Pepper, supra note 2, at 693.
6. See, e.g., Pepper, supra note 2, at 693 (arguing that laws are enacted as general rules of
thumb to achieve certain moral or policy purposes but that their real-world application is often more
nuanced or complex).
7. Kruse, supra note 3, at 658.
8. Simon relies on Dworkin’s argument in Model of Rules I that positivism cannot account for
the role that principles play in legal reasoning. See Simon, supra note 2, at 712–13 (“Dworkin, in
rejecting the positivist ‘Model of Rules,’ insisted that the role of principles and policies in the legal
system precluded any strong separation.”); RONALD DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, in TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14 (1978). Dworkin’s critique of positivism is that it features an implausible
model of adjudication, in which a judge’s decision is either determined by applicable rules or left to
the standardless exercise of discretion. DWORKIN, supra, at 34–35. What we call legal judgment,
according to Dworkin, is better understood as the balancing of rules against principles of political
morality; these principles do not dictate results but “incline a decision one way, though not
conclusively.” Id. at 35. In places, however, Simon ascribes to Dworkin an implausible view about
the scope of principles. For example, he says that impeaching a witness known to be telling the
truth by introducing evidence of the witness’s prior criminal conviction would violate the principle
that parties should not mislead the trier of fact. Simon, supra note 2, at 713. Not only does this
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Despite differences in detail, the critics’ objections come down to this:
The law does not provide some fixed point of reference but can be adapted
by clever lawyers to their clients’ needs. Rather than replacing client
interests with legal entitlements, lawyers just obscure the rent-seeking
process with a rhetorical façade. In the book, I quoted King Louis XII of
France, who supposedly complained that “[l]awyers use the law as
shoemakers use leather; rubbing it, pressing it, stretching it with their teeth,
all to the end of making it fit their purposes.”9 If lawyers really do have this
power of pressing the law into whatever shape best fits their clients’
purposes, the law cannot provide a framework for social cooperation that
transcends disagreement. Not surprisingly, I do not accept the shoe-leather
criticism, as stated by King Louis or by my critics here. The problem in a
short response like this one is to demonstrate how law can be relatively stable
and determinate. Since I cannot reargue the book in a few pages, I will only
suggest that legal scholars should pay more attention to what lawyers
actually do, as opposed to arguing about abstractions.
For example, I have written extensively about the legal advice given
during the Bush Administration Department of Justice (DOJ) lawyers who
concluded that domestic and international law prohibiting torture did not
prohibit interrogation techniques amounting to torture, when performed by
American interrogators as part of the so-called war on terror.10 My response
was that the lawyers had failed in ethical terms as lawyers, not because torture is terrible in ordinary moral terms (although it is), but because the legal
advice given reflects an attitude of contempt, or at least indifference, toward
the law. Recently, it has been reported that DOJ lawyers in the Obama
Administration have prepared a still-secret memo authorizing the President to
kill American citizens abroad without a trial, as long as the President certifies
that they were taking part in hostilities between al Qaeda and the United
reasoning elide the client’s legal entitlement to put the state to its proof, but it relies on a principle
that is too abstractly stated. Legal principles are different from moral principles in that they gain
content and force only as instantiated as legal reasons. In the impeachment example, the principle
that one should not mislead the trier of fact is instantiated in fairly specific rules with clearly
defined triggering conditions and exceptions. The clearest illustration is the prohibition on
presenting false evidence, including the testimony of clients and nonclient witnesses. MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a) (2009). The prohibition applies only when the lawyer knows
the evidence to be introduced is false, with knowledge defined as “actual knowledge.” Id. R. 1.0(f),
R. 3.3 cmt. 8. Moreover, the lawyer should first attempt to dissuade the client from committing
perjury, and if that fails she should seek the guidance of the court, which may order the lawyer to
proceed with normal questioning of the witness or may permit the lawyer to put on the testimony in
a narrative format. Id. R. 3.3 cmt. 7. I am not denying the existence of principles or their role in
legal reasoning, but it is important that lawyers rely on reasons internal to the law, not free-floating
moral ideals that, whatever their attractiveness, are not part of the law.
9. W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW 69 (2010).
10. See generally W. Bradley Wendel, Executive Branch Lawyers in a Time of Terror: The
2008 F.W. Wickwire Memorial Lecture, 31 DALHOUSIE L.J. 247 (2008); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal
Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 67 (2005); W. Bradley Wendel,
The Torture Memos and the Demands of Legality, 12 LEGAL ETHICS 107 (2009) (book review).
The torture memos are discussed in the book in Section 6.1. WENDEL, supra note 9, at 177–84.
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States and it is impossible or impracticable to capture them alive.11 The
government relied on that advice to authorize the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki
and his sixteen-year-old son. One of three things must be true about these
recent killings and the legal advice given to the President: (1) the legal advice
is a sound, faithful interpretation of governing law, and the Obama DOJ
lawyers acted ethically while those in the Bush DOJ did not; (2) the legal
advice is just as unsound as that contained in the torture memos prepared by
the DOJ in the Bush administration and should be criticized in the same
terms; or (3) there is no way to praise or blame either group of lawyers
because the law is like shoe leather and can be formed into whatever shape is
needed to satisfy the client’s wishes. The legal analysis authorizing the
killing of al-Awlaki and his son is still secret, so it has not been subjected to
the extensive, critical scrutiny given to the Bush-era torture memos, but when
the Obama administration memos finally surface, as they undoubtedly will, I
expect conscientious lawyers who are experts in the relevant fields of law to
debate whether the legal analysis is sound. For academic critics to assert the
indeterminacy of law is essentially to abandon the ideal of legality and the
norms of the very craft we purport to teach to our students. Strong
indeterminacy claims have always struck me more as rhetorical posturing
than serious jurisprudential arguments, although there are some sophisticated
sociolegal accounts of the way clients actually experience and comply with
law that deserve serious attention.12 The only way to really refute an
indeterminacy argument, however, is to get inside the practice of making and
evaluating legal arguments.
II.

Exclusion of Morality

Simon is correct to note that I distinguish my position from his, as well
as from those of Luban and Deborah Rhode, in not seeing justice as the
central normative touchstone for legal ethics.13 If the role of the lawyer is
not to be understood in terms of justice, then what social good could it serve?
Critics like Luban, who accuse the book of adopting a Panglossian stance on
the legal system,14 are conflating my argument about the lawyer’s role with a

11. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/middleeast/secret-usmemo-made-legal-case-to-kill-a-citizen.html (reporting on the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki by a
drone-fired missile in Yemen); Glenn Greenwald, The Killing of Awlaki’s 16-Year-Old Son, SALON
(Oct. 20,
2011),
http://www.salon.com/2011/10/20/the_killing_of_awlakis_16_year_old_son/
singleton (“The Executive Branch decided it has the authority to target U.S. citizens for death . . . .
It then concluded in a secret legal memo that Awlaki specifically could be killed, but refuses to
disclose what it ruled or in which principles this ruling was grounded.”).
12. I discuss Kruse’s critique of this argument in Part III. See infra notes 34–43 and
accompanying text.
13. Simon, supra note 2, at 710.
14. Part III of Luban’s review is entitled “The Best of All Possible Legal Systems,” an allusion
to Voltaire’s Dr. Pangloss who, in turn, was a satire of Leibniz’s purported solution to the problem
of evil. David Luban, Misplaced Fidelity, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 673, 679 (2012) (book review).
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more general argument about the social value of the law. To be sure, the
position I take on the lawyer’s role depends on the social value of the law,
but it is limited in an important way: The task of legal ethics is to understand
what constitutes right and wrong conduct by lawyers. Right conduct may be,
as I argue, exhibiting respect for the law in advising one’s clients and in
representing clients in litigation, and the reason this is right for lawyers may
relate to the social goods sought to be secured by the law. This does not
mean, however, that one can always conclude that the law represents a positive good for a particular client in a particular case. Luban rightly
characterizes the problem of overcrowded prisons and conditions of
confinement that may constitute torture as a matter of international law.15 It
truly would be the height of smug complacency to address the prisoners in
one of these torture-chamber prisons and tell them they should be grateful for
the goods secured by the law.16 That stance would have the quality of bad
theodicy, which confidently informs people that they should thank God for
their suffering because God undoubtedly intends to use that suffering for
good elsewhere in the world.17 But my argument is not that the law is always
good for all people; rather, it is that if there is good to be found in law, the
legal system, and the legal profession, it should be understood in a particular
way. It is good that people have available to them a way of organizing
society that manifests respect for one another as equals. This is not all there
is to life, however, and it certainly should not be understood as crowding out
other means of social interaction, problem solving, moral deliberation, and
self-understanding.18
15. Id. at 681.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., BART D. EHRMAN, GOD’S PROBLEM: HOW THE BIBLE FAILS TO ANSWER OUR
MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION—WHY WE SUFFER 8 (2008) (discussing various philosophical
approaches to the problem of theodicy).
18. In an extremely interesting section of his review, Luban unpacks the word fidelity and
charges me, in effect, with making a category mistake. Luban, supra note 14, at 681–86.
Allegations of marital infidelity do not mean merely violating some abstract norm of devotion or
loyalty; rather, they signify specifically going over to a rival, a transfer of allegiance, switching
sides. Id. at 681–82. Betrayal of a friendship likewise means abandoning a person, either in favor
of another or in favor of oneself. Id. at 682–83. Similarly, religious fidelity means refraining from
idolatry or the worship of other gods. Id. at 683–84. In all of these cases, fidelity is something
owed to another with whom one is in a direct personal relationship, unmediated by abstract duties or
relationships constituted through institutions. Id. at 684–85. Luban and I are in complete
agreement that the obligation, if any, to respect the law must derive from respect for the people in
one’s political community, and that disobedience (or, I might add, working around the law) is a
form of free riding that expresses disdain for one’s fellow citizens. Id. Because fidelity is a value
associated with intimate relationships, however, fidelity-related duties are necessarily reciprocal,
and a lack of faithfulness by one party can “snap[] the bonds of reciprocity.” Id. at 685. When a
person or group within a political community is abandoned or subjected to discrimination by the
majority, it would be cruel to call upon these marginalized citizens to express fidelity to the law,
because “the law”—in personal terms, the majority of members of the political community—has
already been unfaithful. Id. It would be tantamount to forcing a betrayed spouse to remain in a
marriage while the other spouse continues cheating. Luban thus inverts the image of faithfulness,
constancy, and loyalty that I meant to invoke in the title of the book, turning it into a powerful
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As Luban notes, however, the entire structure may be a bit fiddly if any
morality is allowed to creep back into deliberation. The process through
which people are able to transcend uncertainty and disagreement, by
replacing first-order reasons for action with the second-order reasons given
by the law, may unwind if lawyers frequently resort back to first-order
reasons.19 This “resorting back” would occur if second-order reasons are not
truly exclusionary but are only presumptive or weighty. Luban has relied on
the idea of recourse roles,20 under which, in some cases, the best way to
remain faithful to the requirements of a role is to violate them. A role is
constituted for some end or ends. In the great majority of cases, the way
someone acting in a role will best accomplish those ends is to follow the
directives of the role. There may be instances, however, in which the best
way to achieve the ends of a role is to do something that is not permitted by
the constitutive rules of the role. In order to make this determination, the
occupant of a role must have recourse back to the ends of the role (hence the
name recourse role).21 Recourse roles nicely capture the role-differentiated
nature of obligations faced by many professionals without losing touch
entirely with the broader social ends for which the professional role is
constituted. As I have noted in a paper published after the book, recourse
roles do not necessarily license wide-open moral deliberation; “rather, an
agent has recourse only to certain considerations, such as the specific task the
role is designed to accomplish.”22 It is actually Simon, not Luban, who
should rely on the idea of recourse roles, because Simon’s overall
argumentative strategy is to juxtapose what many would agree is the end of
the lawyer’s role (legal justice) with the injustices that frequently result in
particular cases. It seems less plausible to think that the end of the lawyer’s
role is to do good in ordinary moral terms, although some philosophers have
argued that law has authority only to the extent that it improves compliance
with morality.23 In my view, which I think is shared by most practitioners,

critique of injustice—“difference made legal” in the words of Martin Luther King Jr. Id. at 684–85.
It is the case that I had interpretive fidelity in mind when I thought of the title of the book, but the
dual meaning of the word does underscore the importance of fairness and reciprocity as the
foundation of the obligation to respect the law. See id. at 685–86 (agreeing that interpretive fidelity
can be an obligation of lawyers).
19. Luban, supra note 14, at 687 (“Wendel’s seemingly minor modification actually
undermines the basic Razian architecture of separating multiple levels of reasons.”).
20. See MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY: A STUDY OF
LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL RULES 15–36 (1973) (“[I]t is precisely to the concept of their
[social] role that people turn when they want to understand what they can and cannot do.”). As
Luban notes in his review, he relied on the structure of recourse roles in his reformulation of the
position in Lawyers and Justice. See Luban, supra note 14, at 687 n.69 (citing David Luban,
Freedom and Constraint in Legal Ethics: Some Mid-course Corrections to Lawyers and Justice, 49
MD. L. REV. 424 (1990)).
21. KADISH & KADISH, supra note 20, at 21–22.
22. W. Bradley Wendel, Three Concepts of Roles, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 547, 553 (2011).
23. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY,
RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 98–99 (2001) (observing that the most important element of
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lawyers are not all-purpose agents who facilitate moral deliberation; rather,
they are simultaneously representatives of clients and ministers of the law
who help clients fit their conduct within the scheme of rights and duties
created by the law.
Whether the end of the lawyer’s role is taken to be justice or morality,
recourse roles are vulnerable to the problem of pluralism. One of the principal arguments in the book, which none of the reviewers seems to disagree
with, is that reasonable, conscientious people may disagree in good faith
about what is required by morality or justice in a particular situation. As a
result, there is a missing “who decides?” question embedded in the recourse
strategy: Suppose a lawyer believes that asserting a client’s legal entitlement,
either as the basis for legal advice or in litigation, will result in either
injustice (to use Simon’s conception of the end of the role)24 or an ordinary
moral violation (Luban’s conception).25 Now suppose the client disagrees
with the lawyer and insists that the lawyer take the lawful action that would
vindicate the client’s legal entitlement. Is it the lawyer’s prerogative to
decide whether to act directly on the end of the role? If so, then giving the
lawyer this decision-making authority undercuts the agency nature of the
lawyer–client relationship.26 On the other hand, of course, the lawyer must
worry about her own moral (not legal) agency. In the vast majority of cases
in a basically just society, however, a lawyer can assume that she is not
committing a moral wrong by helping clients order their affairs with respect
to their legal entitlements. I do not deny the existence of injustice that

understanding a law is understanding what the moral authority that created the law intended the law
to mean); Heidi M. Hurd, Interpreting Authorities, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION 405, 425 (Andrei
Marmor ed., 1995) (arguing that the interpretation of laws must be based upon how well laws
“conform our conduct to the demands of morality”).
24. Simon, supra note 2, at 715–17.
25. Luban, supra note 14, at 676–78.
26. Pepper worries that an obligation of fidelity to law that is too strict will cause lawyers to
lose sight of their obligation to serve clients. Pepper, supra note 2, at 696–97. His objection
underscores the fiduciary nature of the attorney–client relationship, as elaborated in countless cases.
See, e.g., Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1287–88 (Pa. 1992)
(enforcing a preliminary injunction against attorneys who breached their fiduciary duty to their
client). One reason Fried’s lawyer-as-friend metaphor has had staying power is that it makes this
relationship of trust and confidence central to the lawyer’s ethical duties. But a lawyer is not just a
fiduciary; a lawyer is a fiduciary with respect to the client’s interests and the law. Lawyers have the
privilege and the burden of representing their clients’ interests, zealously, within the bounds of the
law. A lawyer does not have a simple, straightforward fiduciary relationship with only one party;
rather, the lawyer and the client are both encumbered by other duties—in this case, respect for the
law—and those duties affect the way the lawyer must carry out her fiduciary obligations to the
client. Cf. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis, 1
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 15, 31–32 (1987) (“The client in such a triangular situation is not a person
alone—the A of classical legal hypotheticals, where ‘A, the owner of Blackacre’ does something to
or is done something by B. One who has become another’s guardian is no longer A but has become
‘A encumbered by duties to B.’”). Picking up on this analysis, the lawyer in my conception of legal
ethics is the representative of “the client encumbered by duties to the law” and also has her own
directly owed duties to respect the law. The lawyer does not merely assist her client in acting but
also in meeting the client’s legal obligations while acting.
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anyone would recognize as such, notwithstanding pervasive moral pluralism.
Rather than try to design a system of legal ethics around those extreme cases,
however, I wrote this book to account for the nature of the good that lawyers
do—most of the time.27
III. Exclusion of Politics
Luban, Kruse, Simon, and Alfieri charge me with being, in Luban’s
words, “[an apologist] for the status quo.”28 Law by itself may not have
much to offer to impoverished, marginalized communities like West Grove,
which is served admirably by Alfieri, his colleagues, and their students.29 I
also would not restrict a community organizer, activist, and lawyer to
formalistic strategies and wooden obedience to law, and in fact, I would
wholeheartedly endorse the multifaceted strategy of private fundraising, a
media campaign, public protests, and political pressure to prevent the closure
of libraries that are vitally important to the West Grove community.30 As
Simon rightly observes, “principled defiance of constituted authority is an
honored tradition in American public life.”31 I share Simon’s admiration of
courageous men and women who participated in lunch-counter sit-ins and the
Birmingham march.32 He is correct that sit-ins and the like were illegal at the

27. In the book I quote Larry Alexander and Fred Schauer’s observation that it would be odd to
focus the study of constitutional law primarily on Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; and Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). WENDEL, supra note 9, at 102–03. The Supreme Court has,
from time to time, really stuffed it up. A lawyer seeking to understand the way courts interpret the
Constitution would be advised to focus mostly on cases that continue to be debated by the Court as
expressions of still-viable constitutional doctrine.
28. Luban, supra note 14, at 680.
29. Anthony V. Alfieri, Fidelity to Community: A Defense of Community Lawyering, 90 TEXAS
L. REV. 635, 635–36, 652–56 (2012).
30. See Alfieri, supra note 29, at 4–5 (“[T]he [Historic Black Church] Program contemplated a
media campaign (e.g., editorials and letters), public protest (e.g., a march, rally, or sit-in), and
political pressure (e.g., reporting selected public officials to regulatory agencies for the purposes of
investigating ongoing unethical or unlawful conduct in unrelated matters), all to persuade local
municipal and county officials to help mobilize public opposition to the proposed closing.”
(footnote omitted)).
31. Simon, supra note 2, at 715. Critics sometimes say I am making a fetish out of the law and
legal authority—Simon’s use of the word “authoritarian,” id. at 718, captures the flavor of this sort
of objection—but it is important to emphasize that the authority of law is, in my view, ultimately
grounded in the value of equality and the obligation to treat one’s fellow citizens with respect.
Simon thinks the fear of anarchy keeps me up at night, id. at 709, but the boogeyman in the closet of
the book is better identified as solipsism and arrogance. I am gratified to see Simon concede that
“lawyers are not routinely privileged or obliged to act on their own views on the ultimate merits of
the controversies in which they are involved.” Id. at 711. Perhaps I have been misreading him for
years, but I have always understood Simon as arguing for precisely the contrary—i.e., that lawyers
either may or must consider whether the actions they take on behalf of their clients are likely to
promote justice. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’
ETHICS 138 (1998) (“Lawyers should take those actions that, considering the relevant circumstances
of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice.”).
32. Simon, supra note 2, at 715.
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time, but there is nothing wrong with a lawyer participating in civil
disobedience, defending clients after the fact against charges of trespassing
or disorderly conduct, or even advising clients to engage in civil
disobedience, as long as the lawyer clearly states that the justice of the
client’s cause does not make the activity lawful. Conversely, the availability
of some strategies of resistance based on legality, political legitimacy, and
legal rights does not preclude the use of nonlegal strategies to accomplish the
end of social justice.33 The only inference I am concerned with blocking is
the one drawn from the justice of some outcome to its legality.
Kruse perceives that I envision the law as the hero in an allegory in
which society faces trouble in the form of an impasse caused by empirical
uncertainty or normative pluralism.34
But like my colleague Jim
Henderson’s feckless superhero Captain Torts,35 the law sometimes either
fails to rescue people from trouble or manages to make things even worse
through its intervention.36 Kruse agrees that the law transforms controversy,
and she acknowledges that this is a good thing, but she denies that the law
ever really settles anything. In the debate over same-sex marriage, for
example, “the language of law continues to provide ways to formulate and
package the issues in the debate,” using analogies with civil rights claims
raised by interracial couples to clarify the rights at stake.37
This
transformation is not complete, however; it is a repackaged moral debate, but
the terms of the debate are still set by “reason and the public good,” not
merely by what is lawful.38 The law merely provides additional conceptual

33. Cf. Alfieri, supra note 29, at 33–34 (“In the context of low-income communities of color,
democratic lawyering offers race- and identity-conscious strategies of advocacy and counseling
fashioned from dissenting voices traditionally outside law, legality and legitimacy . . . . [L]awyer
candor, collaboration, and a race-conscious conversation best steer the normative assessment of
legal–political strategies . . . and the practical consideration of alternative nonlegal tactics . . . .”).
34. See Kruse, supra note 3, at 663 (“Wendel’s functional argument in a nutshell is that we
should respect the law despite our moral disagreement with its content because law does for us
something that we cannot do for ourselves: law rescues us from moral pluralism.”).
35. One of my goals as a legal academic is to make better known the story of Captain Torts, one
of the great unpublished characters in jurisprudence:
Captain Torts is a fellow about [Henderson’s] size (let us simply say a large person),
[who] wanders through our society seeking to protect people from the wrongs of
others. Captain Torts is dressed in a baggy leotard, with a cape and a large yellow T in
a circle on his chest. Whenever he hears of someone in distress, he enters the scene
(usually, if possible, through a window) and attempts a rescue. Much of the time, he is
a welcome addition, and helps to correct imbalances of power between persons in the
society. Occasionally, . . . Captain Torts is resented by the people that he tries to help.
On those occasions, the people try to push him back out the window. What all of this
means, Henderson leaves to the reader.
JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS: TEACHER’S MANUAL 20 (7th ed. 2007).
36. For an example of an argument that the law sometimes makes societal disagreement worse,
see John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973).
37. Kruse, supra note 3, at 667–68.
38. Id. at 668.
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resources, such as notions of rights, duties, and due process, with which to
conduct this ongoing debate.39 This leads Kruse to a challenging critique of
my position, namely that the functional and normative arguments to respect
the law should be recast as argument to respect the legal system. A legal
system consists of much more than enacted laws to be followed—including
multiple avenues for citizen participation in the process of democratic selfgovernment. In contrast with my nightmare of intractable disagreement,
Kruse posits a noble dream of law opening a space within which a plurality
of moral viewpoints can thrive.40 Society should not aim for settlement
(even on a provisional basis) of moral controversy, but it should provide
avenues for peaceful, constructive disagreement to thrive.
The book does attempt to account for “the complex interplay created
between private compliance with (or deviance from) law and public
lawmaking.”41 Drawing from the work of Lauren Edelman and Mark
Suchman, Section 6.4.2 shows how employers responded to the legal definition of sexual harassment and the obligations imposed on employers to
prevent a hostile work environment.42 Kruse is correct that the process of
complying with antidiscrimination laws is not a simple, linear one of reading
a law and obeying its clear directive; instead, the meaning of the laws
emerged through application, as employers tried to figure out how to comply
with an uncertain, shifting mandate. Law therefore enables politics rather
than preempting disagreement. I do not disagree with this way of putting
Kruse’s criticism if the relevant actors believe themselves to be attempting in
good faith to ascertain what the law permits or requires. Respect for the law
may include grudging acquiescence as well as open disobedience.43 What is

39. Although controversy continues about same-sex marriage, the law does settle at least some
issues. If the clerk of Tompkins County, New York, refuses to issue a marriage license that covers
a same-sex union (a highly unlikely occurrence given the politics of Ithaca, but it’s a hypothetical),
then one can criticize the county clerk in terms of the ethics of public office for substituting his or
her own view about morality for a legal entitlement to receive a marriage license.
40. Kruse, supra note 3, at 670–71.
41. Id. at 671.
42. See WENDEL, supra note 9, at 203–07.
43. To be clear, I do not intend anything in the book to ground a criticism of community
lawyers as abusers of the law, as Alfieri fears. Alfieri notes that “daily combat against inner-city
poverty and racial inequality requires the creative enlargement of conventional lawyer roles and
functions as well as the expansion of constitutional, statutory, and common law entitlements.”
Alfieri, supra note 29, at 649. I could not agree more. There is a deep and subtle debate between
some proponents of critical legal studies on the one hand, and critical race theory on the other, over
whether legal rights are oppressive or empowering. Patricia Williams argues, for example, that
legal rights are a way of insisting that powerful white actors recognize the dignity and power of
African-Americans. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 146–66 (1991).
For Williams, assertions of rights confront the denial of human needs in a way that requires
acknowledgement of these needs. See id. at 153 (“For the historically disempowered, the conferring
of rights is symbolic of all the denied aspects of their humanity: rights imply a respect that places
one in the referential range of self and others, that elevates one’s status from human body to social
being.”). Although I lack Williams’s eloquence, I have tried to say something similar: progressives
should not make such a totalizing critique of power imbalances in society that they call into
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ruled out, however, is covert nullification or manipulation of the law. There
is room in my vision of legality for lunch counter sit-ins as well as the backand-forth between courts and employers that created the existing law of
sexual harassment through an iterated process of court challenges and new
mandates to employers. Legal settlement is not a one-time event. Rather, it
can be a process by which actors in society orient themselves around legal
rights and duties. This does not preempt nonlegal ordering, but it does make
possible a distinctive kind of order in which citizens justify their actions to
each other with reference to social procedures that reflect shared values of
equality and dignity.
IV. Stupid Laws
It is not surprising that my reviewers have sought to embarrass the
position in the book by pointing to laws that, as Pepper nicely puts it, have
results that “may be perverse in relation to generally accepted values or the
particular values underlying the legal provision.”44 Pepper’s example is a
prohibition on hiring undocumented workers, which prevents a working
couple from hiring a child-care provider.45
Simon imagines the
discriminatory enforcement of an archaic fornication statute that criminalizes
consensual sex between unmarried adults.46 Although they put the objection
more kindly, what they are really saying is, “Surely you cannot mean that
this law is deserving of respect!” But to quote the late Leslie Nielsen’s
character in Airplane!, “[I do mean that], and stop calling me Shirley!”47
In Pepper’s case, the lawyer cannot tell the couple that it is legally
permissible to hire the undocumented worker. Pepper envisions the lawyer
giving categorical and somewhat dismissive advice: “[Y]ou can’t and
shouldn’t [hire the worker]. It’s unlawful.”48 He is right that the situation is
more complex, morally speaking, than the law as written, and a lawyer is free
to convey these additional subtleties to the clients in the form of moral
counseling. Nevertheless, the presence of nuance and complexity in the
world does not undercut the conclusion that the distinctive aspect of the role
of lawyer—as opposed to others who dispense advice about morally complex

question the capacity of official institutions to recognize rights in favor of disempowered citizens
against the powerful. My critics here are fond of ascribing various anxieties to me, so I will admit
to worrying that treating the law instrumentally will result in a long-term impairment of its capacity
to underwrite demands for respect by the powerless.
44. Pepper, supra note 2, at 693.
45. Id. at 693–94.
46. Simon, supra note 2, at 714.
47. The actual bit of dialogue, for those who are not children of the 70s and 80s, is:
Dr. Rumack: I won’t deceive you, Mr. Striker. We’re running out of time.
Ted Striker: Surely there must be something you can do.
Dr. Rumack: I’m doing everything I can, and stop calling me Shirley!
AIRPLANE! (Paramount Pictures 1980).
48. Pepper, supra note 2, at 694.
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subjects—is that lawyers are responsible for ensuring that their advice
conforms to the duties and permissions contained in the law. The “abstract
and wooden”49 tone of the advice given by the lawyer in Pepper’s
hypothetical is the result of Pepper imagining an officious, self-righteous
lawyer expressing disapproval of the client’s predicament. I have no problem whatsoever with lawyers conveying a sense that the law is misguided,
out of touch with reality, or perverse, but these judgments by the lawyer do
not give the lawyer license to counsel the client—even indirectly, with a
wink and a nod—to ignore the law. If the client chooses to take the risk of
violating the law, as long as the lawyer has not blessed or encouraged this
conduct, the legal and moral blame rests with the client.50
I also worry a bit that labeling some laws as anachronistic, foolish, or
otherwise undeserving of respect reflects a certain elite condescension
toward normative positions with which we (the “royal we”) disagree.
Personally, I think it is idiotic that there is a criminal statute prohibiting
unmarried adults from having consensual sex, but evidently, a substantial
number of my fellow citizens believe that the existing antifornication statutes
have got the balance just right.51 I have to recognize that my reaction to this
statute reflects other beliefs I have concerning sexual morality and the
appropriate scope of the criminal law that may not be universally shared, and
that the law is not so crazy that no rational human being could ever endorse
it. Although none of the reviewers here has misinterpreted my view as moral
relativism of the kind familiar to anyone who has taught an introductory
ethics class, I want to be clear and say that I believe it is really correct to say
that there is nothing morally wrong with premarital sex, and even if there
were, it would not be appropriate to criminalize it. Nevertheless, I
acknowledge that others have deliberated conscientiously about this question
and have reached the contrary conclusion.
V.

Conclusion: My Nightmares and Noble Dreams

Luban and Kruse allude to Hart’s opposition between the nightmare of
unlimited judicial discretion and the noble dream of a profession (in Hart’s
case, the judiciary; as Luban suggests, lawyers in their capacity as legal

49. Id. at 695.
50. A lawyer who takes this stance is not a “legal cipher,” as Pepper suggests. Id. at 700. In
my view, the propriety of moral counseling within the attorney–client relationship is an entirely
contingent matter. Some clients, as a result of a long-term professional relationship characterized
by trust and mutual respect, might appreciate a lawyer telling them that it would be morally
wrongful to plead the statute of limitations to escape a legal obligation. Pepper is also right to note
that a particular client may have business reasons for doing the decent thing notwithstanding a legal
entitlement to the contrary. Id. at 701 & n.48. In these cases, moral counseling would be
appropriate—maybe even expected by the client—but it is not a requirement of the role as such.
51. If there is truly no remaining support for the law, it may be invalid under the doctrine of
desuetude. I am assuming here that the statute has been challenged on these grounds and has not
been invalidated for that reason.
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advisors) dedicated to a craft that contributes to social stability and
solidarity.52 As this metaphor shows, a theory of law or legal ethics may be
animated by a fear that a different approach is the road to some imagined
hell. The major figures in the field of legal ethics—many of whom I am
honored to have as critics in this Colloquy—seem, ironically, to be worried
about an excessive tendency on the part of citizens and lawyers to obey the
law. Simon exalts civil disobedience and even nullification of law,53 Luban
reminds us that the Milgram Experiments demonstrated that people are not
particularly inclined to resist unjust authorities,54 and even Pepper and
Freedman—who have resolutely defended the standard conception against its
academic critics for many years—have been concerned to provide avenues
for conscientious objection by lawyers.55 The nightmare case in the back of
the minds of these theorists is the German legal profession in the Third Reich
or the American legal profession in the Jim Crow South, all too willing to
lend their assistance and expertise to the administration of an unjust regime
by faithfully interpreting and applying positive law. The figure of the
lawyer-as-Eichmann haunts many legal ethicists. Their noble dreams, on the
other hand, invoke real lawyers like Louis Brandeis or fictional characters
such as Atticus Finch to highlight the virtues of wisdom, discretion, and
informed judgment about both morality and the law.56 Not surprisingly,
these lawyers tend to be nonconformists and mavericks, willing to disobey
orders or blow the whistle if they believe the client’s ends are unjust.57

52. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 131–32 (2007); Kruse, supra note 3,
at 670–71. Nicola Lacey has taken this phrase as the subtitle for her biography of Hart, suggesting
that the great philosopher’s life was itself both of these things. NICOLA LACEY, A LIFE OF H.L.A.
HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE DREAM (2004).
53. In one of my favorite papers of his, Simon argues that portrayals of lawyers in popular
culture tend to depict lawyers as praiseworthy to the extent they are willing to violate the law in
service of higher moral principles. William H. Simon, Moral Pluck: Legal Ethics in Popular
Culture, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 421, 447 (2001).
54. LUBAN, supra note 52, at 237–66.
55. Pepper does so in the context of moral counseling. Pepper, supra note 2, at 699–702.
Freedman insists that lawyers must make a morally grounded choice to represent any given client
and are fully morally accountable for those choices. MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH,
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS § 4.02, at 69–72 (4th ed. 2010).
56. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 2, at 715–16 (citing HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD
312–18 (40th Anniversary ed. 1999) (noting that Atticus Finch agreed with the sheriff to conceal
evidence of Boo Radley’s involvement in the death of Bob Ewell); SIMON, supra note 31, at 127–35
(citing approvingly the ethics of Brandeis, who while a lawyer in private practice sought to dissuade
powerful clients from engaging in antisocial projects).
57. Cf. Alice Woolley & W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and Moral Character, 23 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1065, 1067 (2010) (arguing, inter alia, that the types of lawyers picked out as
admirable by many theories of legal ethics would actually be dysfunctional in institutional practice
settings).
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My nightmare is set in a world in which not all lawyers possess the
rectitude and trustworthiness of Brandeis and Finch but are just as keen to act
as moral free agents. The fear is not really anarchy, as Simon believes,58 but
the abuse of power. The figure that haunts my dreams is that of John Yoo,
presenting his “legal” advice with a straight face to the President, informing
him that the law authorizes waterboarding, or of the in-house and retained
lawyers for Enron who authorized the transactions that eventually toppled the
company. In my dreams the lawyers do not believe themselves to be acting
wrongly; rather, they think they are respecting the ethical principle of zealous
advocacy. Never mind that they are counseling clients or structuring
transactions, not acting as advocates—they believe themselves to be ethically
permitted to rely on strained, distorted, and implausible (or, stated more
positively, creative and aggressive) interpretations of law to advance their
clients’ ends. Even worse, they may believe themselves to be doing
something morally praiseworthy because it is in the public interest. John
Yoo, for example, clearly sees himself as a hero and a patriot for doing
whatever was necessary to protect the American people from terrorism.59
My noble dream is not a lawyer of extraordinary wisdom and discretion
but merely a regular person who balks at bending the law out of shape to
permit her client to do something. In a basically just society, lawyers
perform a valuable function, but it is one different from that performed by
members of the clergy, psychotherapists, writers, political leaders, activists,
community organizers, and citizen protesters. The role of lawyers is more
technocratic but no less noble. Bureaucrats like Eichmann can be the instruments of monstrous evil, and the Third Reich could not have functioned
without the willing assistance of people just doing their jobs. But the rule of
law can be a great good too, and it also cannot exist without people doing
their jobs.
Within a moderately decent society, the ethics of lawyers acting as
lawyers has to be oriented toward the law, not morality or justice. If lawyers
wish to be activists or dissidents, they can be, but it is essential that they not
confuse these very different social roles. I am not blind to the injustices that
remain in the United States, but the legal response to these injustices should
not be individual acts of sabotage or nullification. Lawyers can and should
advocate for change, but as always, it should be zealous advocacy within the
bounds of the law.60 One of the principal aims of this book was to restore the

58. Simon, supra note 2, 709.
59. See generally JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS (2006).
60. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980) (“A lawyer should represent
a client zealously within the bounds of the law.”). The notion of zeal survives in the modern
disciplinary rules only in a few comments. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 2
(2009) (“As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the
adversary system.”); id. R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (“A lawyer must also act with . . . zeal in advocacy upon the
client’s behalf.”). Nevertheless, the Model Code formulation has remained influential and is quoted
tirelessly by lawyers as a concise summary of their ethical obligations.
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last part of the lawyer’s mantra just stated to its proper place in legal ethics.
Without the constitutive obligation of fidelity to law, lawyers are just
sophists—offering nothing beyond the kind of half-baked moral advice that
any decent client could supply for herself. If there is something distinctive
about our profession, it has to be a commitment to the value of legality and a
corresponding obligation to respect the law.

